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to the work of mathematicians, dominated by the much-heralded Moscow school of mathematics,
strong in the theory of functions of a real variable and its applications to topology and several other
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establish full ideological control over all branches of mathematics. C° 1999 Academic Press
C° 1999 Academic Press
MSC 1991 subject classifications: 01A60; 01A72; 01A74; 01A80.
Key Words: A. N. Kolmogorov; N. N. Luzin; set theory; topology; dialectical materialism; Institute
of Red Professoriat; Leningrad Physical–Mathematical Society.
It took Marxist writers five years after the October Revolution to begin writing on mathe-
matical themes. There were two strong reasons for this delay. First, the Marxist classics—by
Marx, Engels, and Lenin—left no readily accessible and sustained comments on modern
mathematics that could be used as pathfinders and protective guides in critical surveys of
contemporary developments in the field. Second, such modern branches of mathematics as
set theory and the foundations of mathematics, both of which invited much philosophical
criticism, were so new that they were not included in school curricula at the time when
most Marxist writers received their secondary and higher education. In other words, most
of them were not well prepared to handle new mathematical ideas and their philosophical
implications.
Once they began to publish articles in newly founded journals, such as Under the Banner
of Marxism, Marxist writers faced another problem: beyond the ostensible philosophical and
ideological unity of their views, there were broad areas of disagreement fueling widespread
factionalism and distracting expressions of personal idiosyncracies. In 1918, the Bolshevik
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authorities founded the Socialist Academy (renamed the Communist Academy in 1923),
which was assigned the task of making Marxism a unified and consistent system of philo-
sophical propositions. The new institution, however, made little headway in its principal
assignment. From the beginning until the end of the 1920s, it was torn by internal conflict
in interpreting the place of dialectics in scientific explanations of natural processes—one
group considering dialectics the fundamental explanatory principle in science and the other
assigning it a secondary position. Internal strife created conditions reducing the possibility
of effective Marxist interference with the work of mathematicians, who, in fact, enjoyed a
high degree of autonomy.
FIVE SUPPOSITIONS OF MARXIST PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IN THE 1920s
In a general survey of mathematics written for the Great Soviet Encyclopedia in 1938,
A. N. Kolmogorov noted that Soviet scholars had been engaged in an effort to set up a histor-
ical and philosophical study of mathematics on the basis of Marxist dialectics [18, 394]. He
hastened to add that this endeavor was still in its initial phase. The bibliography appended
to his survey contained references only to two slim publications related to a Marxist inter-
pretation of the philosophical foundations of mathematics. The mathematicians showed a
clear tendency to avoid the basic issues of a philosophical and sociological nature that called
for a direct confrontation with dialectical materialism. At the same time, Marxist theorists
concentrated on specific topics and made no effort to produce an integrated and compre-
hensive picture of mathematical ideas viewed through the prism of dialectical materialism.
Although fragmented and generally vague, the Marxist philosophy of mathematics during
the 1920s was built on five basic and rather disconnected suppositions.
First, the highly abstract level of its theorems and axioms makes mathematics particu-
larly attractive to various schools of philosophical idealism. “Mathematical idealism” is a
powerful and pernicious companion of “physical idealism.” It is incumbent upon Marxist
theorists to exercise particular vigilance in resisting the leading orientations of mathematics
that showed idealistic learning. Logicism, formalism, and intuitionism are the most influ-
ential orientations in the foundations of mathematics that must be rejected. The reasons for
rejection are clear and categorical. Logicism reduced mathematics to a branch of formal
logic, fully detached from the dialectics of practical life and existential conditions. It found
the most consistent interpretation in Principia mathematica by Bertrand Russell and Alfred
North Whitehead, based on an absolute reign of symbolism, which, in Marxist description,
was “a shortcut to solipsism.” [3, 57]. Formalism emphasized the search for axioms treating
mathematics as a totality of formulas written in accordance with specific rules and devoid of
specific content. It was viewed by some as without a base in experience and without concrete
prototypes, despite the fact that David Hilbert’s book, The Foundations of Geometry, was
regarded as the prime representative of the position. L. E. J. Brouwer and Hermann Weyl
introduced intuitionism, steeped in “subjective” judgments. According to this orientation,
the foundations of mathematics are built by “intuition” rather than by “reason.” “Despite
their interesting achievements of minor consequence,” all these orientations, according to
P. S. Aleksandrov, a pioneer in set-theoretical topology, are too weak to meet the philosoph-
ical challenge of modern mathematics [1, 32].
Although mathematics represents the highest level of scientific abstraction, the empirical
base of its theorems cannot be denied. It must be recognized, however, that high-level
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mathematical notions are separated from their empirical moorings by a long series of
intermediary abstractions. The empirical origin of mathematical principles is translated into
the practical orientation of mathematical knowledge. According to Engels, practice supplies
archetypes for all mathematical concepts and operations. The utilitarian value of their
discipline makes mathematicians natural enemies of idealistic philosophy. It encourages
the successful blending of mathematics with both the precepts of Marxist ideology and the
demands of socialist construction.
I. E. Orlov, the most active Marxist commentator on developments in modern mathemat-
ics, noted the striking scarcity of Marxist experts in this dicipline, which, in his opinion,
required closer scrutiny because of its “idealistic spirit and engagement in a war against
materialism” [25, 86]. He reasoned that the main task of Marxist scholars should be to op-
pose all tendencies in modern mathematics to concentrate on high abstractions completely
removed from reality. To Einstein’s statement, in “Geometry and Experience,” that “as far
as the propositions of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they
are certain, they do not refer to reality,” he answered that “mathematics is certain insofar
as it is related to reality; if it is not related to reality there is no possibility to establish its
certainty” [9, 233; 25, 91].
Second, the increasing mathematization of science must be considered a reliable index of
the progress of scientific thought. The process of mathematization, however, cannot meet
all the needs of scientific methodology; every subject of scientific inquiry contains “qualita-
tive” elements not conducive to mathematical treatment. The social sciences, in particular,
consist mainly of “qualitative” material and can benefit but little from methodological tools
supplied by mathematics. Maxwell achieved a great scientific feat by translating Faraday’s
“qualitative analysis” into a mathematically formalized system of physical principles. But
a translation of Marx’s political economy into a system of mathematical formulas would
be “practically impossible and totally unnecessary” [37, 164]. All claims that sociology is
an “imperfect” science insofar as its methodology is not rooted in mathematics must be
viewed as fallacious. “Extensive application of mathematical methods would not only fail
to produce ‘astronomical precision’ but, on the contrary, would lead to a complete destruc-
tion of sociology. Only an improvement in qualitative analysis can improve the exactness
of sociology as a science for it alone can reach the depths of social life” [37, 162–163].
Mathematical procedures can profitably be used by the social sciences, but they cannot meet
all their basic needs.
Third, more than any other discipline, mathematics supplies incontrovertible proofs of
the unity of science, which, in turn, provides conclusive proof of the unity of nature. Some
mathematical theorems and procedures can be applied profitably to qualitatively different
components of nature; group theory, for example, is a valuable tool in crystallography no less
than in quantum mechanics. That the same abstract principles of mathematics can explain
different orders of nature proves both the unity of nature and the unity of science. Above all
else, it proves the unity of mathematics, which has been dimmed by the bewildering growth
of new schools and directions in mathematical thinking. Despite their consistent emphasis
on the unity of mathematics, Marxist theorists of the 1920s supplied little analysis to give
this idea a deeper philosophical meaning.
Fourth, deprived of an experimental base, mathematics depends primarily on con-
structions of formal logic. However, mathematics cannot depend on formal logic alone.
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The dialectic—the synthesis of contradictions—is a particularly valuable method of
mathematical advancement. By recognizing and unifying contradictions in the existing
mathematical conceptualization—and by rising above the syllogistic limitations of formal
logic—dialectical logic opens new vistas for the advancement and expansion of the mathe-
matical mode of thinking. Differential calculus, Marxist theorists argued, provides a classic
example of discovery by means of “dialectical synthesis”—by unifying contradictions that
defy formal, logical procedures.
The dialectic is not only an inner mechanism responsible for creating new mathematical
knowledge. It also provides the criteria of utility that direct the development of mathematics
as a science responding to both methodological needs of science and the technological needs
of society. A basic function of the Marxist theorist is to point out—and to criticize—all ten-
dencies in the community of mathematicians to divert numerous branches of their discipline
from the acute needs of science and society. In other words, the task is to combat all elements
of philosophical idealism. In Marxist theory, mathematics becomes a full science only when
it responds to the methodological needs of science and the technical needs of society.
Fifth, Marxist scholars recognize that mathematics is more than an accumulation of facts
and procedures; it is also dependent on theoretical constructions guided by specific hy-
potheses. It is in the choice of hypotheses and in the construction of theories that social
and cultural influences penetrate the depth of mathematical thought. It is through this influ-
ence that the element of ideology becomes inseparable from the process of mathematical
advancement. The element of ideology gives science a social-class character [7, 127–131].
To understand the influence of ideology, it is thus necessary to analyze philosophical ap-
proaches to mathematics. Dialectical materialism is the only philosophy viewed as offering
the exactitude of science; all other philosophies are placed in the general category of “ide-
alism,” a manifestation of “bourgeois ideology,” or are denounced for their leaning toward
“mechanical materialism,” which treats the universe as a mechanism not subject to dialec-
tical contradictions. Two books—Frederick Engels’s Dialectics of Nature and V. I. Lenin’s
Materialism and Empiriocriticism—provide answers to basic philosophical and epistemo-
logical questions related to mathematics, as well as to science in general. Engels’s and
Lenin’s ideas, however, do not readily apply to new developments in mathematics—such as
the rapid advancement of set theory—causing considerable unsettledness and controversies
in philosophical circles. During the 1920s, the Marxist philosophy of science was far from
a unified system of ideas—a phenomenon working to the advantage of the community of
mathematicians and other scientists.
Much of the confusion in the Marxist analysis of mathematics had two transparently
clear sources: an ideological compulsion to exaggerate the “idealistic” leanings of many
modern mathematicians and a doctrinaire rigidity in identifying the branches of mathematics
characterized as impractical and as targets of direct attack. Led by Lenin’s warning about
the excessive mathematization of modern physics as an invitation to philosophical idealism,
individual Marxist philosophers of the 1920s were particularly apprehensive of the elaborate
mathematical structures of modern physics. According to one critic, modern physicists relied
on “mathematical systems” as a substitute for “real phenomena” [22, 157]. They refused to
grant any degree of independence to experimental research, transforming it into a technique
concerned exclusively with the verification of theoretical ideas. Physics, they added, cannot
follow the paths of thorough mathematization advocated by Einstein and Weyl; it must
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retain “the equilibrium and harmony” of laboratory experiment and mathematically deduced
theory [22, 187].
MATHEMATICIANS AND MARXIST PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS
At this time, mathematicians, in contrast to Marxist theorists, showed a clear tendency
to refrain from any effort to interpret their science in the light of dialectical materialism.
When they did enter the area of philosophical debate, they avoided doctrinaire engagements.
Isolated mathematicians pleaded with Marxist scholars to avoid rash judgments and dog-
matic rejections of schools of thought with avowed idealistic leanings. In 1926, for example,
A. I. Khinchin, an internationally noted expert in probability theory, cautioned the members
of the Communist Academy against the sweeping rejection of intuitionism as an idealistic
orientation in the foundations of mathematics [15, 184–192].
V. A. Steklov, a noted mathematical physicist and Vice President of the Russian Academy
of Sciences, adopted a different strategy: he offered an analysis of the philosophical prob-
lems of mathematics which had little in common with dialectical materialism. In 1923,
he relied on the epistemological views of David Hume to prove, first, that mathematical
procedures, despite the perfection of their inner logical unity, could do no better than pro-
duce approximative laws of nature, and, second, that practical experience (and experiments)
played the decisive role in validating scientific laws [35, 22–23]. Marxist theorists were fa-
vorably disposed neither toward Hume’s relativistic epistemology nor toward his treatment
of the experimental method only as a technique of scientific verification. At this time, how-
ever, they were not ready to expand their philosophical offensive. In 1926, Steklov came
closer to the Marxist philosophy of mathematics. In his speech in Kazan on the occasion
of the centenary celebration of N. I. Lobachevskii’s non-Euclidean geometry, he stated that
Lobachevskii’s work in mathematics supplied irrevocable proof of “the incorrectness of all
idealistic systems in philosophy,” as well as of Kant’s ideas “which occupied a position
between idealism and materialism” [33, 58]. Steklov belonged to the group of academi-
cians who recommended Einstein for honorary membership in the Russian Academy of
Sciences.
In a popular essay on Galileo’s conflict with the church, Steklov turned directly and
categorically against all efforts to make official ideology part of scientific engagement. He
asserted that science encumbered with “party” doctrines had little chance to advance. No
doubt, his statement carried a message to Bolshevik authorities, aspiring to establish thor-
ough ideological control over the entire national involvement in science. Perhaps because
he did not refer directly to the ideological ambitions of the Soviet government, Marxist
critics did not bother to take action against him. History had shown, he wrote, that every
effort to limit the freedom of the scientific mind was destined to end in failure [44, 98–99;
42, 5–6].
Prior to Stalin’s rise to power, it was not unusual for leading scientists to make critical
statements about the relations of science to Marxist philosophy without being exposed to a
government vendetta. S. N. Bernshtein—a professor of mathematics at Kharkov University,
a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and a noted expert in the
theory of functions, differential equations, and axiomatics of probability theory—presented
a paper at the All-Russian Congress of Mathematicians held in Moscow in 1927 in which
he cast doubt on the possibility of creating working relations between mathematics and
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dialectical materialism [45, 59]. He not only escaped retaliatory actions by the government,
but, in 1928, was elected a full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the highest
honor a scholar could receive in the Soviet Union. Election to full membership in the
Academy did not pacify Bernshtein, however. In 1930, at the First All-Union Congress of
Mathematicians, convened in Kharkov, he repeated his earlier statement that he saw no point
at which mathematics and dialectical materialism intersected and that they should be allowed
to function independently of each other [51, 38]. Later in the 1930s, he was among the few
members of the Academy who defended genetics from Lysenko’s attacks. No doubt, his
high international reputation, unusually high standing in the national scientific community,
and clear lack of “illegal” political connections helped him to escape a Stalinist vendetta. At
that time, ground was broken for extensive—and constantly mounting—Bolshevik control
over the full range of social and cultural life. By the mid-1930s, the repressive institutional
network of Stalinism had become a reality.
In 1925, A. N. Kolmogorov, at the age of 23, entered the philosophical debate by publish-
ing a paper in the general field of the foundations of mathematics. Unrelated to dialectical
materialism, “this paper anticipated not only Heyting’s formalization of intuitionist logic,
but also the translatability of classical mathematics into intuitionist mathematics” [29, 276;
19, 414–437]. An astute analysis of the logical principle of the excluded middle (tertium
non datur) led Kolmogorov, in a subsequently published paper, to an intricate study of links
between intuitionism and other orientations in the foundations of mathematics [20, 58–65].
He also showed the way for translating classical mathematics into intuitionist mathemat-
ics. His discussion, however, was too abstract to evoke a response from the sparse ranks
of Marxist theorists interested in mathematics. Kolmogorov did succeed in one impor-
tant respect, however, He brought intuitionism closer to Soviet mathematical thought and
made it both a basis for further elaboration and a springboard for general criticism of logi-
cism and formalism. He emphasized the broad promises of intuitionism at a time when
Soviet Marxists were preoccupied with laying the groundwork for their own foundations
of mathematics, opposed, partially or completely, to the three reigning orientations in the
West.
One journal devoted to Marxist theory, the Herald of the Communist Academy, did reflect
a somewhat lenient view toward intuitionism in publishing a paper on this topic by A. Ia.
Khinchin, professor of mathematics at Moscow University. Khinchin was an expert on the
application of the theory of functions of a real variable to probability and number theory. A
close friend and collaborator of Kolmogorov, he found Brouwer’s and Weyl’s intuitionism
more promising than either Russell’s logicism or Hilbert’s formalism. Intuitionism, he noted,
represented an exciting and spirited effort to make mathematics a science with clearly and
firmly defined subject matter rather than a “formally irreproachable logical play” [15, 184].
Khinchin argued that the rejection of the principle of the excluded middle and of the idea
of infinity helped intuitionists to place mathematics on “solid ground” and to give it an
orientation that invited close cooperation with the most advanced branches of science. It
was true, he said, that mathematics had no room for contradictory axioms, but it was also
true that this rule did not provide for a full and clear definition of mathematics. He welcomed
Hilbert’s recently published “ ¨Uber das Unendliche” which stated that only the idea of the
finite makes it possible for mathematicians “to think substantively” [15, 191]. The idea of
infinity, he observed, existed neither in nature nor in thought.
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Intuitionism, as Khinchin saw it, accepted axioms that were both “intuitive” in origin
and “real” in reference to nature as a subject matter of scientific inquiry. In defending
intuitionism, he noted its rapid growth and increased popularity in recent years. On his
prodding, the Communist Academy organized a special colloquium on intuitionism. In one
respect, at least, the colloquium was not successful: the leading Marxist philosophers of
mathematics continued to criticize the “subjective” and “idealistic” features of intuitionism.
Khinchin, for his part, emphasized that this orientation was still in an embryonic stage and
that, despite its realistic promises, a more definitive appraisal of its place in the foundations
of mathematics should be left for a future date.
While Marxist theorists continued to present intuitionism as a philosophical stance
steeped in idealism, the mathematicians showed no sign of abandoning their acceptance
of its basic principles. They received strong backing from N. N. Luzin, one of the most
respected and influential members of the Soviet community of mathematicians. Closely
linked with the French and Polish orientations in set theory and a noted contributor to
the theory of functions of a real variable, he was generally critical of intuitionism, but he
also made enough favorable statements to encourage a closer look into and elaboration of
Brouwer’s fundamental views [29, 275–276]. Intuitionism, he noted, answered the cardinal
questions beyond the reach of set-theoretical considerations.
Whether they worked in the foundations of mathematics, in the deeper theory of functions
of a real variable, or in probability theory, the members of the Moscow school were united
by a vigorous esprit de corps, which steered them toward giving consistent and enthusiastic
support to outstanding achievements of individual colleagues. Moscow mathematicians
worked as a tightly knit and enthusiastic group of mutually cooperating experts working
under the umbrella of set theory as it moved into new branches of mathematics. Their
unity combined with the excellence of their results gave them strength in resisting all
efforts to subject them to rigid control by Marxist authorities. Most leading mathematicians
published their major papers in French and German mathematical journals—and in Borel’s
well-known mathematical monographs—making them less accessible to the sparse ranks
of Marxist critics and more accessible to the international community of mathematicians.
THE VIEWS OF A. V. VASIL’EV AND N. A. VASIL’EV
During the 1920s, no anti-Marxist mathematician participated in the debate on the philo-
sophical underpinnings of the discipline more than A. V. Vasil’ev. An admirer of Henri
Poincare´’s conventionalism, which treated mathematical theories as results of scholarly
consensus, and of Ernst Mach’s variety of neopositivism, Vasil’ev was particularly eager to
show Lobachevskii’s contribution to the epistemological and logical foundations of “new
mathematics” in what he viewed as the proper light. Thus, Vasil’ev interpreted Lobachevskii
as being strongly inclined to treat “mathematical reality” as a construction of human reason
rather than as a special reflection of external reality existing independently of the human
mind. In a paper read at the centenary celebration of the discovery of the first non-Euclidean
geometry held in Kazan in 1926, Vasil’ev went out of his way to emphasize the close ties
between Lobachevskii’s mathematical legacy and David Hilbert’s work on the axiomatics
of geometry, which formed the backbone of formalism in the foundations of mathematics.
He left no doubt about his favorable impression of Hilbert’s work first on the foundations
of geometry and then on the foundations of analysis and arithmetic, all contributing to the
114 ALEXANDER VUCINICH HMAT 26
formalist orientation in the foundations of mathematics, and all uncompromisingly attacked
by Marxist critics [33, 27]. Lobachevskii’s work, according to Vasil’ev, provided a basis for
Hilbert’s view of the formal unity and consistency of axioms and theorems as the true key
for identifying the foundations of mathematics [40, 26–27]. At this time, Marxist theorists
were firmly united in rejecting formalism as a metaphysical theory steeped in aprioristic
idealism.
Vasil’ev’s views on Lobachevskii’s non-Euclidean geometry reflected the relevant com-
ments made by such Western leaders in mathematical thought as Pasch, Peano, Poincare´,
Russell, and Hilbert, who helped make geometry more flexible and broader in decoding
the secrets of space. The new geometries had no footing in experiment; they were products
of pure reason and deductive logic. Their real strength lay in the noncontradictory nature
of their axioms and in the absence of valid empirical arguments against them. Marxist
interpreters, by contrast, placed the primary accent on Lobachevskii’s statement that all
mathematical principles—presented as products of reason alone and viewed as “indepen-
dent of the external world”—were totally useless [43, 204]. They identified Lobachevskii’s
philosophical views with 18th-century French sensualism, and were strongly inclined to
ignore the contributions of non-Euclidean geometry to the axiomatization of mathematics
at the very beginning of the 20th century. In the opinion of Marxist critics, Lobachevskii
viewed science as a reflection of the order of nature; Vasil’ev was strongly inclined to sup-
port the group of eminent mathematicians and Einstein who claimed that the order of nature
was a creation of science.
Vasil’ev’s epistemological elaborations were not consistent. In his 1926 Kazan address, he
fully endorsed Hilbert’s axiomatics, assisted by non-Euclidean geometry, as a nonempirical
construction achieved with the help of geometrical deductions [33, 27]. He appeared to
have fully accepted Einstein’s position that mathematics, as a foundation of physics, was
a product of pure reason, untrammeled by the world of sensations reflecting the external
and objective world. He viewed the absence of logical contradictions as the quintessential
element of scientific validity. In 1923, in his study of the prehistory of the theory of relativity,
he was close to Ernst Mach’s “relativistic positivism,” based on “the denial of any other
reality apart from our sensations—a train of thought leading back to Protagoras through
Berkeley” [41, 226]. To add strength and authority to his arguments, he recalled Goethe’s
statement that “all natural philosophy is in the last resort only anthropomorphism. We can at
will observe nature, measure, calculate and ponder it, but it always remains our impression,
our world. Man always remains the measure of things” [41, 227]. According to a Marxist
critic in 1925, Vasil’ev “agreed with [philosopher, Ernst] Cassirer, who claimed that Einstein
had destroyed the last remnants of the physical essence of space and time replacing them
by relations between numbers” [14, 80]. Some Marxist critics referred disapprovingly to
Vasil’ev’s claim that Einstein’s theory of relativity was thoroughly and consistently Machian
in its emphasis on subjective epistemology [34, 52; 14, 34].
While Vasil’ev viewed Lobachevskii’s non-Euclidean geometry as a major contribution
to the 20th-century triumph of idealism in the philosophy of science, A. A. Maksimov,
a recent graduate of the Institute of Red Professoriat, a special “university” emphasizing
the Marxist approach to science, saw in new geometrical systems a trailblazer for the
coming triumph of philosophical materialism in its dialectical version. In the non-Euclidean
principles advanced by Lobachevskii, Gauss, and Riemann, he saw systems of abstractions
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widening the links of science with “the real or possible worlds” [46, 118]. He did not go
beyond making a general statement on the place of new geometries in the world outlook of
modern science. It took Marxist theorists a long time—actually until World War II—to find
ways of working out a comprehensive integration of Lobachevskii’s ideas into dialectical
materialism.
The Kazan celebration injected a nationalist element into the discussion on the scientific
effects of Lobachevskii’s non-Euclidean geometry. In an elaborate and tightly knit sequence
of arguments, A. P. Kotel’nikov, an eminent mathematician from Moscow, argued that
Minkowski’s mathematical codification of the special theory of relativity included a series
of propositions that, in his opinion, were closely related to Lobachevskii’s non-Euclidean
principles. In his opinion, “Lobachevskii’s three-dimensional geometry of space determined
Einstein’s laws of mechanics” [21, 66]. This idea, rejected by Einstein, became a standard
topic of discussion during most of Soviet history, both Stalinist and post-Stalinist.
In 1923, Vasil’ev published Space, Time, Motion, a limpid study of the prehistory of
Einstein’s theory of relativity beginning with Protagoras’s claim that “man is the measure of
all things” [41, 8]. In the English translation, for which Bertrand Russell wrote an introduc-
tion, he added a footnote identifying Lenin as a supporter of a “metaphysical” interpretation
of space and time [41, 81]. Holding an epistemological view reflecting the “subjectivist”
bent of the philosophies of Poincare´ and Mach, Vasil’ev became a regular target of attack
by Marxist theorists. Quietly reflecting Poincare´’s and Mach’s epistemological views, he
published in 1927 the most detailed biography of Lobachevskii to that time, in which he
emphasized, of course, the presentation of the first non-Euclidean geometry. Government
censors, however, stopped the distribution of this book and ordered the destruction of the
entire edition, with only a few copies surviving. The book was republished in 1992, a year
after the disintegration of the Soviet Union [39]. Its abortive “publication” in 1927 came at
a time before Marxist theorists had shown serious signs of presenting their attitudes toward
Lobachevskii’s non-Euclidean legacy. They regarded Vasil’ev as a “bourgeois professor,”
who joined Cassirer and astronomer and physicist, Arthur S. Eddington, in efforts to turn
the theory of relativity against materialism [52, 115].
In Einstein’s theory of relativity, which, by dethroning Kantian notions of space and time,
made both physics and geometry “empirical” sciences, Vasil’ev saw a royal road to modern
scientific wisdom that had no need either for “mystical” elaborations of metaphysics or
for orientations that considered “the materialism of Haeckel and Engels, the last word in
human thought” [41, 228]. Soviet Marxists joined Vasil’ev in his attack on the idea of
absolute space and time. Their attitude, however, differed from Vasil’ev’s: while Vasil’ev
was favorably disposed toward Leibniz’s contention that space and time were not things but
“methods of contemplating them,” Marxist theorists did not waver in their conviction that
space was “a form of matter in motion” [41, 68].
In 1921, Vasil’ev had led a group of Leningrad University physicists and mathematicians
in founding the Leningrad Physico-Mathematical Society for the purpose of improving
the flow of ideas such as relativity that signaled the 20th-century revolution in science.
Present at the founding session was Bertrand Russell, who read a paper on his views on
the experimental study of space. [30, 38–40]. Vasil’ev was one of the most active founders
and the first president of the new society, which became an oasis for scientific and social
thought not committed to dialectical materialism, the ideological pillar of the Bolshevik
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regime. At the end of the 1920s, the society was infiltrated by “red professors” and became
an arena of mounting internal strife. In 1931, it ceased to exist as an organized body.
In 1925, N. A. Vasil’ev (the son of A. V. Vasil’ev) presented a paper entitled “Imagi-
nary (non-Aristotelian) Logic” at the Fifth International Congress of Philosophy, held in
Naples, a crowning achievement of his prolonged effort to create a nonclassical logic. Just
as Lobachevskii founded an “imaginary geometry” by rejecting the parallel postulate of
Euclid’s geometry, so Vasil’ev, also affiliated with Kazan University, laid the foundations
for an “imaginary logic” by rejecting the laws of contradiction and excluded middle built
into Aristotelian logic. In both cases, the use of the adjective “imaginary” designated an in-
tellectual adventure in challenging traditional thought. Prolonged illness prevented Vasil’ev
from completing his challenging and fruitful work on the adaptation of logic to the rev-
olutionary currents of 20th-century scientific thought. He was generally recognized as a
pioneer of the modern recognition of the need for more than one logic to meet the un-
usual complexities of modern science. His challenge to the Aristotelian law of the excluded
middle in logic added a tributary to both intuitionist logic and intuitionism as a major ori-
entation in the foundations of mathematics. N. N. Luzin, the leader of the Moscow school
of mathematics, readily admitted that Vasil’ev’s studies in logic were of major importance
to the most modern currents in mathematics [4, 77]. Long before Marxist theorists, Vasil’ev
anticipated a growing alliance of logic and mathematics.
MARXIST CRITICS IN THE FACE OF MATHEMATICAL THOUGHT
Not poised to handle Lobachevskii’s mathematical legacy, Marxist critics simply decided
to treat it only in the most perfunctory fashion. At that 1926 Kazan University centennial
of the discovery of the first non-Euclidean geometry at which A. V. Vasil’ev spoke so
eloquently on Lobachevskii, for example, no Marxist interpretations were presented in sig-
nificant detail. Lunacharskii, the only Marxist speaker, limited his fleeting remarks to noting
Lobachevskii’s pioneering work in changing the foundations of modern mathematics and
in setting the stage for a major change in the scientific world outlook [33, 67]. He made no
effort to spell out his views either on the effects of Lobachevskii’s geometrical ideas on the
foundational aspect of mathematics or on the place of geometry in modern philosophy.
O. Iu. Semkovskii, one of the more learned Marxist theorists, talked on “Lobachevskii,
Kant, and Einstein” at another non-Euclidean geometry centennial celebration sponsored
by the Philosophical Institute of Marxism at Kharkov. He offered a summary of the most
obvious similarities between Lobachevskii’s and Einstein’s rejections of Kant’s aprioristic
interpretation of space and time. In his view, the triumph of non-Euclidean geometry was the
triumph of mathematics as an empirical science. He made no effort to advance a thorough
and coherent Marxist interpretation of Lobachevskii’s geometrical ideas.
Another Marxist theorist, Z. A. Tseitlin, was a trained physicist who favored philosophical
metaphors and who sought for a unity of Descartes’s mechanistic philosophy and Marxist
theory [47, 115]. In a series of articles on mathematical themes, this leader in the very
active so-called “mechanist” faction of Marxist theory rejected any possibility of providing
empirical proof for human perception of space and was strongly inclined to claim superiority
for Euclidean geometry over its non-Euclidean competitors. Euclidean geometry, Tseitlin
claimed, was “simpler” and more “economical.” He went so far as to claim that non-
Euclidean geometries could be used as methods of scientific inquiry but not as indicators of
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the real existence of curved space–time [8, 277]. He obviously found difficulty in matching
the Keplerian notion of the unity and the harmony of the universe, which Marxist theory
accepted, with the idea of several geometries. In his opinion, a more precise mathematical
analysis of space as a physical concept was one of the more basic requirements for a
comprehensive and precise Marxist interpretation of the theory of relativity [38, 131–132].
Like Marxist theorists, the communities of Moscow and Leningrad mathematicians
showed little interest in Lobachevskii’s revolutionary contributions. Kazan, North
Caucasian, and Perm universities deserved major credit for making Lobachevskii’s scientific
legacy a living topic of mathematical studies. Most of these studies focused on matching
Lobachevskii’s geometrical principles with the content and the spirit of the 20th-century
revolution in science.
Soviet mathematicians were generally united in resisting the kind of mathematical
utilitarianism—or practicalism—emphasized by the more dogmatic—and unrealistic—
representatives of dialectical materialism. Khinchin gave a clear description of prevalent
thought among his mathematical colleagues: “We, mathematicians, are little concerned
with daily charges by technicians and natural scientists that modern mathematics suffers
from vagueness. Deeply convinced of the living reality of the subject which we study, we
are justly convinced that these reproaches are dictated by the unfounded dissatisfaction
of individuals who . . . do not see the achievements of our science beyond the sphere of
their narrow horizons and who do not anticipate the great benefits they would reap from
this science in the future” [15, 184]. That Khinchin found “technicians and natural scien-
tists,” rather than Marxist scholars, guilty of misunderstanding the practical promises of
new mathematics was merely a tactical move to preserve the state of relative tranquillity in
the relations between mathematicians and interpreters of Marxist thought.
In 1925, the editors of the journal Under the Banner of Marxism prodded Marxist philoso-
phers to step up their campaign against “idealism nourished by nondialectical interpreta-
tions of the substance and the methods of mathematics.” They thought that Marxist criticism
should concentrate on “the idealistic philosophy built into Cantor’s mathematical theory”
[3, 24]. The response to this call was slow, fragmented, and steeped in petty quarrels. The
burgeoning Marxist philosophy of mathematics was set back by raging disputes among
specialists. Marxist philosophers, for example, did not agree on the role of probability the-
ory as a mathematical discipline with deep roots in national tradition. Individual Marxists
considered this theory a temporary measure called for by the inadequacies of mathematics
in the study of certain kinds of processes and variables. Others considered it a permanent
and indispensable component of mathematical knowledge, applied to both “normal” and
“random” phenomena. They treated it as the only possible response of mathematics to cer-
tain kinds of natural and social phenomena [17, 157]. At least one Marxist commentator
claimed that the theory of probability represented a dialectical unity of the normal and the
random in natural and social phenomena [32, 267–268; 28, 201]. Other commentators ex-
plained random activities as phenomena not covered by the principle of causality, while still
others expressed an opposite view. According to Orlov, no abyss separated “randomness”
from “mechanical causality,” and the two could transform into each other [26, 109].
Marxist theorists avoided certain mathematical problems for the simple reason that they
were not prepared to handle them. They criticized the “idealistic” foundations of Cantor’s set
theory, but they made no effort to produce a “materialist” counterpart. They did not even go
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so far as to set the preliminary stage for such an endeavor. In Cantor’s statement that “sets”
were made of distinct “objects” or “elements” as products of “our intuition or our thought,”
Marxist critics could detect only a declaration of war on materialism as a philosophical
foundation of mathematics [5, 85]. In their criticism of the philosophical foundations of set
theory, Marxist writers were encouraged by the existence of a strong initial wave of Western
rejections of Cantor’s ideas. As cited by Joseph W. Dauben, Henri Poincare´, a leading light
in mathematical physics, saw in Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers “a great mathemtical
malady,” and Leopoid Kronecker viewed Cantor as a mathematical charlatan [6, 1].
The unusual complexity of set theory, the backbone of the rapidly growing and power-
ful Moscow school of mathematics, prevented Marxist critics from undertaking detailed
scrutiny of its inner fabric as advanced generally in the theory of functions of a real variable
and specifically in restructured probability theory, topology, and the foundations of math-
ematics. Led by N. N. Luzin and boasting such world-renowned mathematicians as M. Ia.
Suslin, P. S. Urysohn, A. N. Kolmogorov, P. S. Aleksandrov, L. G. Shnirel’man, and L. A.
Liusternik, the Moscow school of mathematics appeared as the country’s most original and
creative contributor to science [31, 532–534]. This situation did not prevent an influential
Marxist critic from asserting that Cantor’s theory “not only provided doubtful results but
was also based on illogical speculation” [24, 74].
I. E. Orlov, the indefatigable critic of “mathematical idealism,” wondered why so many
experts considered Cantor’s set theory a brilliant contribution to recent advances in mathe-
matics. He was inclined to place the main emphasis on the intellectual climate that favored
“pure reason”—rather than “concrete experience”—as the supreme and unchallengeable
creator of the most advanced branches of mathematics. As a secondary reason, he men-
tioned the pronounced tendency of modern mathematicians to concentrate on refining and
amplifying Cantor’s theories rather than on subjecting them to critical analysis. He thought
that set theory, like any theory not built on an empirical base, was a fortuitous development
and a passing fad [27, 147].
Even less so than Cantor’s theory, David Hilbert’s much-heralded effort to axiomatize
geometry was not a major topic of Marxist discussions. The little that was published on
this attractive and intriguing theme was, however, generally unfavorable. G. Bammel’, a
Marxist commentator on current developments in mathematics, rejected Hilbert’s axiomatic
approach on the ground that it admitted only one “abstract moment” in the building of geo-
metrical knowledge and fell short of giving a true picture of such categories as “motion and
time” [2, 158]. Hilbert based his formalist orientation on the assumption that no additions
to geometrical systems contradicted the existing configurations of axioms. His empha-
sis was clearly on the law of continuity and consistency in the growth of geometry, and
his formalism was based on the assumption that all mathematical theories were correct
because they did not lead to contradictions. In his view, the law of continuity and consis-
tency made geometry a particularly inviting discipline for the application of the axiomatic
method, which he subsequently applied to analysis and arithmetic. Hilbert thought that
additions to established sets of geometrical axioms were realizations of potentials built into
earlier axioms. Bammel’ expressed a view in total opposition to Hilbert’s orientation: he
claimed that contradictions—subject to dialectical synthesis—were the lifeline of mathe-
matical progress. While Hilbert relied on formal—or Aristotelian—logic as a mechanism
of the historical growth of mathematical knowledge, Bammel’ defended the idea of strict
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dependence on dialectical logic. He was too busy criticizing the “idealistic” foundations of
Hilbert’s philosophy to advance Marxist views on the potentials of mathematical axiomatics.
He was critical in attacking Hilbert’s views and dogmatic in defending Marxist positions.
Marxist theorists depended mainly on passing comments in expressing their opposition to
the pronounced tendency of modern mathematicians to view their discipline as a product of
“pure reason” (in Einstein’s terminology). Trapped by the ideological rigidity of their philo-
sophical principles, they were unable to perceive the expanding flexibility of mathematics
manifested in its increasing capacity to decipher the secrets of nature on both macroscopic
and microscopic levels. They had little inclination to accept the idea that different scien-
tists can use different mathematical methods to solve the same problems in the study of
the world and its processes. Philosophically, they were unwilling to recognize the strategic
role of intuition in the achievement of mathematical knowledge. The first edition of the
Great Soviet Encyclopedia explicitly stated that “dialectical materialism does not recognize
intuition as a special source of knowledge.” Modern mysticism, it continued, “combines an
affirmation of intuition with a negation of science” [13, 39].
FRAGMENTATION OF MARXIST COMMENTARY ON MATHEMATICS
Marxist commentators on the modern developments in mathematics—and in science,
in general—were divided into two major groups representing opposing views. One group
considered Marxism an open theory demanding constant work on improvement and mod-
ernization. The Communist Academy was the actual center of this group. The second group,
loyally echoing the ideas and sentiments of Bolshevik leaders, tended to make Marxist the-
ory a closed system of philosophical principles and ideological imperatives. The principles
were accepted dogmatically and no theoretical improvement was required. The leaders of
this group had easy access to Under the Banner of Marxism, the leading and most author-
itative Marxist philosophical-ideological journal. While this group was guided by the idea
that science was on the right track only when it supported the basic postulates of Marxist
philosophy, the first group worked on the assumption that the very survival of Marxist phi-
losophy depended on its effective adjustment to basic changes in scientific knowledge. The
second group consisted mainly of the graduates of the Institute of Red Professoriat, founded
in 1921. It built the stepping stones leading to full-blown Stalinism. The most outstand-
ing representatives of the first group were S. Iu. Semkovskii and Boris Hessen, who saw
no reason dialectical materialism should not absorb all the basic ideas and mathematical
operations built into Einstein’s theory of relativity.
Crisscrossing this division was the doctrinal split between “dialecticians” and “mecha-
nists,” the latter group objecting to the former group’s heavy reliance on “mystified Hegelian
categories and laws” and on Engels’s “outdated ideas” presented in Dialectics of Nature
and calling for a more critical Marxist appraisal of the ongoing scientific revolution. There
was yet another split in the ranks of Marxist theorists: one group advocating full separation
of science from philosophy, even if the latter went under the label of “science” as in the
case of dialectical materialism; the other group arguing that Marxist philosophy provided
a reliable and indisputable source of guideposts for the advancement of scientific knowl-
edge. A Marxist writer went so far as to claim that dialectical materialism was ahead of the
natural sciences as a source of objective truths [7, 135]. As a result of government pressure,
advocates of full separation of science and philosophy were seldom heard from.
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The fragmentation of philosophical thought, combined with the unceasing official war
on “idealisms” of all kinds, steered mathematicians away from philosophical issues, though
individual voices were never fully silenced. On occasion, political authorities decided on the
merits of new scientific ideas without waiting for various groups of scientists to express their
opinions. A revolutionary discovery made by A. A. Friedmann, keenly interested in the math-
ematical apparatus of the theory of relativity, provided a graphic example of such a decision
that automatically prevented controversial debates. A careful and highly competent read-
ing of Einstein’s cosmological equations in the general theory of relativity led Friedmann
to conclude that this theory supported the idea of a nonstatic, and probably expanding,
universe [11, 377–387; 12, 326–333]. Einstein read Friedmann’s first report published in
the Zeitschrift fu¨r Physik and rejected both its basic premises and its conclusions. Soon,
however, Einstein changed his mind and helped to make the idea of the expanding universe
one of the leading and most impressive contributions of modern cosmology, particularly
after Edwin Hubble’s “red shift” studies. Moved ideologically, Soviet political authorities
rejected this idea on the ground that it invited a belief in the role of a divine power in pulling
the trigger that started the expansion of the universe. Under government pressure, Soviet
astronomers did not recognize the idea of the expanding universe until the early 1960s.
Not seriously disturbed by the feuding Marxist groups and by the Soviet government
during the 1920s, Soviet mathematics made remarkable progress and became the crowning
achievement of a strong national tradition founded by Leonhard Euler in the 18th century
and P. L. Chebyshev in the 19th century. Mathematics benefited from an unusually favorable
concentration of talent and from considerable isolation from ideological controls mounted
by the Bolshevik authorities, which became more concentrated, widespread, and ominous
at the end of the 1920s, marking the beginning of the Stalinist phase in Soviet history.
In 1929, with Stalin’s rise to absolute political power, the Soviet government was deeply
involved in subjecting the development of the national economy to centrally controlled
annual and five-year plans. The time had also come to introduce centrally coordinated
planning in the national commitment to the pursuit of science. To facilitate planning in
mathematics, the Communist Academy ordered, as the first step, a study of major activities
in this discipline with the view of eradicating “outdated” concerns and “fancy” and “useless”
new developments [16, 168–169]. It also recommended an appraisal of the advantages and
disadvantages of the growing tendency to form distinct schools in mathematics and analysis
of whether the presence of “schools” narrowed the horizons of scientific involvement.
The first report covered the work in topology by individual members of the Moscow
school of mathematics [10, 169–188]. Its author, E. Frankl’, gave an intelligent and in-
formed account and offered a laudatory evaluation of Soviet work in topology. In the course
of his analysis, he argued that “every branch of mathematics is as important for both math-
ematics and physics as the new sources of energy are important for technology” [10, 188].
Adding that “we should not make an issue of the fact that at the present time [topology’s]
applications appeared to be limited,” he further claimed that “topology has become an exact
science by its synthesis with set theory” [10, 172, 188]. Moreover, Frankl’ so completely
avoided references to the relations of topology to dialectical materialism in his report that
the Communist Academy responded by abandoning the ambitious report altogether! The
Academy learned that it was exceedingly difficult to find individuals who were both experts
in mathematics and deeply involved in Marxist philosophy of science. Its abandonment of
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its announced project reflected Marxist ideology’s ultimately unsuccessful confrontation
with mathematical thought in the late 1920s.
CONCLUSION
The Bolshevik authorities worked continuously to expand and strengthen their control
over the scientific community. In the early 1920s, they outlawed all journals and other
publications accused of supporting ideological and theoretical views incompatible with
Marxism. They then sponsored the founding of vigilante organizations—such as the Society
of Militant Materialists, the Section of Scientific Workers, and the All-Union Association
of Workers in Science for Cooperation in Socialist Construction (VARNITSO)—whose
primary purpose was to gather information on active and potential political dissidents. With
equal vehemence, they worked on their most difficult task: to establish unity among Marxist
theorists. The Second Congress of Marxist Scientific Institutions, meeting in 1929, passed
a formal resolution claiming Marxist unity as its main achievement, but Stalin, who had
just become the supreme authority in Soviet politics, did not agree. In his opinion, it was
only the first step toward the kind of monolithic unity he had in mind.
In a move to strengthen Marxist influence in scientific organizations, the mathematical
section of the Communist Academy decided in 1929 to establish a seminar in the history of
the exact sciences. The initial sessions concentrated on the scientific revolution in the sev-
enteenth century locating the causes of internal conflict in disparate interests of social-class
origin. The ultimate aim of the seminar was to prove the “correctness” of the materialistic
orientation in mathematics.
The Communist Academy, whose scientific section was headed by the mathematician
O. Iu. Shmidt, an expert in group theory, made an effort to establish working relations
with prominent mathematicians. Responding to its invitation, A. N. Kolomogorov pre-
sented a paper on the impact of Brouwer’s intuitionism on the Moscow school of set theory,
L. A. Liusternik spoke on the relations of quantities and qualities in mathematics, and
L. L. Shnirel’man lectured on the evolution of the concept of function in modern mathe-
matics [49, 67]. These and other papers delivered in this series gave direct mathematical
information without Marxist elaborations. Their basic purpose was to acquaint Marxist
theorists with the salient trends in contemporary mathematical thought.
At the time when Stalin took over the political reins, another step was taken to strengthen
Marxist influence in mathematical organizations. As clearly illustrated by the Leningrad
Physical–Mathematical Society, selected mathematical organizations were suddenly inun-
dated by new members hastily trained in mathematics but carefully screened for their deep
loyalty to the Communist regime and its ideology. The basic function of new members was
to wage a relentless and publicly aired war against persons accused of violating Marxist
norms as built into state ideology.
All these developments helped prepare the way for Stalin to take the helm of the Soviet
political system. They were harbingers of Stalin’s policies aimed both at making mathe-
matics a primary instrument of socialist construction and at eliminating all deviations from
the Stalinist version of Marxism. Despite portentous signs on the horizon, the 1920s will be
remembered as a decade of limited and rather ineffective Marxist ideological–philosophical
interference with the professional work of mathematicians.
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With meager guidance from the Marxist classics and tenuous guidance by the
Bolshevik authorities, Marxist theorists were involved in long and bitter debates of a theoret-
ical nature and were clearly divided into feuding groups. Some Marxist writers, represented
by Orlov, believed that probability theory was but a temporary mathematical tool that would
last only until more exact methods came along. Others, typified by Ernst Kol’man, thought
that probability theory offered the only possible way to handle certain sets of natural pro-
cesses [17, 153–157]. Still others, exemplified by Tseitlin, preferred to stay with Euclidean
geometry alone, while some welcomed the empirical grounding of non-Euclidean geome-
tries as well [8, 122–125; 50, 122–125].
There was another major characteristic of Marxist commentators on modern develop-
ments in mathematics: as a rule, they looked at mathematical ideas of individual scholars
through the latter’s philosophical views, usually scattered, unelaborated, and questionably
linked with mathematical ideas. They never reversed the process by looking at philosoph-
ical ideas through the prism of mathematical contributions. Nor were they predisposed to
question whether mathematics and philosophy were related to each other in the first place,
or whether individual mathematicians expressed contradictory ideas. In most cases, they
cast their arguments more in ideological than in scientific terms.
Set theory, both as an independent system of mathematical theories and as an anchor for
several crucial branches of modern mathematics, occupied an anomalous position in the
Soviet Union in the 1920s. On the one hand, Soviet mathematicians hailed it as the greatest
achievement of recent mathematics and as the backbone of the nation’s most formidable
contributions to modern science. On the other hand, it was impossible to encounter a Marxist
theorist favoring Cantor’s mathematical contributions. The usual criticism was that set
theory was “totally detached from experience”—that it is “a pure and free creation of
reason, having no contact with actual reality” [24, 61]. Attacks on the “idealistic” leanings
of set theory focused on Cantor rather than on Soviet mathematicians.
During the 1920s, Marxist writers generally abstained from subjecting individual Soviet
mathematicians to open harassment. To a degree, N. N. Luzin, head of the Moscow school of
mathematics, was an exception, having served as an occasional target of untoward remarks,
stated fleetingly and without venomous intensity. He was usually accused of denying the
objective nature of mathematical theories and of challenging the very essence of Marxist
philosophy of science. He was criticized for his rejection of the possibility of advancing a
“proletarian mathematics” built on the intellectual resources of dialectical materialism. It
was not until the 1930s—the first decade of Stalinist rule—that “proletarian mathematics”
became a dynamic part of the Soviet state ideology.
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